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0.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This report contains the findings of two studies that investigated majority-minority relations in 
Malta, mainly by looking at the views of the Maltese majority and the Arab minority on migrant 
integration. This executive summary details the key findings of the studies and highlights 
recommendations for improving intergroup relations. 
 
0.1 STUDY 1: ARABS’ VIEWS CONCERNING ARAB INTEGRATION IN MALTA 
1. This study, conducted in the first half of 2019, adopted a qualitative approach. 15 Arab 
participants were engaged in in-depth semi-structured interviews concerning their views 
on the integration of Arabs in Malta. 
2. Participants generally argued in favour of some form of integration or mutual engagement. 
3. Experiences of discrimination and media bias against Arabs were perceived as hindering 
migrant integration in Malta. 
4. Some form of integration was perceived as being necessary, and the active pursuit of this 
was viewed favourably. Some participants also noted improving Maltese-Arab relations 
over generations. 
5. Problems with institutionalised discrimination, self-critical aspects and the slow pace at 
which integration is taking place were also highlighted. 
6. Mixed/ambivalent arguments emphasised individual differences (e.g., the view that both 
Maltese and Arabs can be open or cautious toward each other) and the possibility of 
improvement if issues are dealt with. 
7. A previous similar qualitative inquiry with Maltese participants was carried out, ending in 
2016 (Sammut et al., 2018). The resulting views of both Arabs and the Maltese were used 
to compose an integration scale.  
 
0.2 STUDY 2: MALTESE & ARAB VIEWS ON MIGRANT INTEGRATION 
1. An online survey was carried out amongst Maltese (non-Arab) and Arab (with or without 
Maltese nationality) respondents. 340 participants were recruited using snowball sampling. 
2. Respondents in this study were asked to indicate (i) the extent to which they agreed, and 
(ii) the extent to which they think that Arabs (for Maltese participants) and the Maltese (for 
Arab participants) agreed with 12 statements that expressed either pro-integrationist or 
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anti-integrationist sentiments. These statements were based on the findings from Study 1 
and a previous similar qualitative inquiry with Maltese participants (Sammut et al., 2018). 
Statements were ranked for their pro- or anti-integrationist sentiment by 15 independent 
experts in fields related to intercultural relations, prior to being used in this study. 
3. Arab participants were more pro-integrationist than Maltese participants on all 12 
statements, except for one. 
4. Arab and Maltese participants agreed to the same extent with the view that “Migrants 
would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get along with the 
locals”. 
5. Both Maltese and Arab participants resulted as being pro-integrationist overall, with Arab 
participants being more pro-integrationist. 
6. Maltese participants hold slightly pro-integrationist views. 
7. Maltese participants perceive Arabs to be less pro-integrationist than Arab participants 
were in this study, suggesting that Maltese participants do not have an accurate perception 
of Arab views on integration. 
8. Arab participants perceive the Maltese to be slightly pro-integrationist, implying that Arab 




1. The findings in this study suggest that any communication strategies or similar efforts 
aimed at improving majority-minority relations are more likely to be effective if they move 
from relatively common grounds, on which both groups show similar levels of agreement 
(e.g., “Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get 
along with the locals”), toward reasonably obtainable goals (e.g., “As a minimum, there 
should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs”). 
2. We recommend staircasing public opinion among the Maltese, by presenting arguments 
sequentially, incrementally arguing in favour of views that are more pro-integrationist. We 
recommend doing so until public opinion is consolidated vis-à-vis the view that “As a 
minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs”. 
3. The integration scale can be used to keep track of public opinion and assess whether desired 
goals are being successfully implemented, and whether groups are converging in their 
views of integration as well as their views about each other.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This report presents the key findings on majority-minority relations in Malta that emerged from 
two studies: a qualitative study amongst Arabs living in Malta in the first half of 2019; and an 
online survey carried out with 340 respondents in Malta between November 2019 and January 
2020. Recent decades have seen intergroup relations become more salient, particularly following 
Malta’s accession to the European Union in 2004. Recent Eurobarometer studies have found that 
Malta consistently ranks among the top three EU states when it comes to viewing immigration as 
the most important concern facing the EU (European Commission, 2018, 2019a, b). Various issues 
contribute to this heightened focus on migration and intergroup relations, ranging from local 
concerns regarding ways of life and cultural identity, to broader concerns surrounding future 
uncertainties. Minorities in Malta face similar issues as they seek to adapt to the cultural 
environment of the host country (i.e., acculturate) and secure a decent life in Malta for themselves 
and future generations. 
 
This report conceptualizes intergroup relations in a broad manner, highlighting both the 
perceptions of the majority (that is, Maltese natives) and minorities (in this case, Arabs in Malta), 
giving equal consideration to the perceptions of both groups. Moreover, the report focuses on the 
perceptions of the majority and the minority concerning each other’s views. This allows us to make 
recommendations that accord with local cultural conditions. 
 
The report starts by presenting background qualitative research with Arab participants, conducted 
to complement previous research with Maltese participants (see Appendix A for a more detailed 
overview). The key findings of the survey are then presented: namely, the views of the Maltese 
concerning integration; the views of Arabs concerning integration; what the Maltese think that 
Arabs think of integration; and what Arabs think that the Maltese think of integration. This is 
followed by a discussion concerning the findings and how they can be employed in the service of 
improved intergroup relations in Malta. 1  
                                                          
1 The research described in this report forms part of ongoing doctoral work by Luke J. Buhagiar (see also 
Buhagiar & Sammut; manuscript in preparation). 
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2.0 BACKGROUND RESEARCH: STUDY 1 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the views of Arabs in Malta concerning the integration of 
Arabs, and to build a scale that can be used in survey research. The study with Arab participants 
adopted a qualitative approach involving the use of in-depth semi-structured interviews. This 
section details the procedure involved in carrying out the interviews with participants and 
analysing the data, together with the results obtained. It concludes by presenting the scale to be 
used in further research, and the summarised findings from Arab participants in this study 
compared to those of Maltese participants from a previous similar study carried out in 2016 and 
reported in Arabs in Europe: Arguments for and against integration (Sammut et al., 2018). 
 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE 
Fifteen participants were recruited by means of snowball sampling, whereby participants were 
asked to participate, and to refer the researcher to other potential participants who may be willing 
to participate. The interviews were carried out between February 2019 and May 2019. Eleven 
participants were male, and four participants were female. The youngest participant was 21 years 
old, and the oldest participant was 68. All participants were of Arab origin, out of which two were 
of Arab-Maltese origin. The respondents held various nationalities, ranging from various Arab 
League states to Maltese. Participants had varying levels of education, and all participants 
identified as Muslim except one. The in-depth interviews took place at locations chosen by the 
interviewees themselves. All interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed and translated into 
English prior to data analysis. Participants were informed about their rights and informed consent 
was obtained prior to each interview. 
 
During the interviews, participants were asked to provide their viewpoints concerning the 
integration of Arabs in Malta. Participants were engaged in discussion and asked to provide 
justifications for their views, and to supplement their arguments with examples and any qualifying 
statements that might contextualize their views. The interview thus started with a direct question 
asking participants for their opinions concerning the integration of Arabs in Malta. This question 
was aimed at eliciting participants’ central claims. This was followed by a question asking 
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participants to provide reasons for their claims and any examples they can use to substantiate their 
claims. Finally, participants were asked whether there were any exceptions to their main claims. 
The interviewer then proceeded to make a summary of the arguments made by the respondent, and 
asked the respondent to correct any mistakes in the summary (see Appendix A for more 
background details).  
 
2.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
The first step in the data analysis involved coding the various claims posited by the respondents. 
The similar claims made across participants were then grouped together with the purpose of 
eventually identifying the different arguments that respondents used to substantiate similar claims. 
This initial step resulted in 35 claims. The second stage involved a thematic categorization of the 
claims, meant at grouping those that made similar arguments concerning integration. The 
identified themes were cultural, religious (religio-cultural), socio-political, psychological, stigma-
related and economic. In turn, arguments within such themes were given a valence (positive, 
negative or mixed) vis-à-vis integration. It is worth noting that (a) a positive valence usually 
signified arguments stating that integration is happening, or else positive aspects of Arab-Maltese 
relations; (b) a negative valence usually signified arguments stating that integration is not 
happening, or else difficulties hindering integration; and (c) a mixed valence usually signified 
arguments pushing ambivalent claims. The final step involved analysing the data to code for the 
justifications (i.e., warrants or reasons), evidence (i.e., specific examples that participants used to 
substantiate their claims) and qualifiers (i.e., statements used to calibrate the argument), which 
supported the arguments made (see Appendix A for more details). 
 
2.3 FINDINGS 
On the whole, the majority of participants favoured some form of integration. No participant 
argued actively and categorically against integration; participants either highlighted the fact that 
integration is difficult to achieve, or else gave a different label to what they perceive as the best 
outcome, for fear that the term ‘integration’ can be co-opted in order to preclude Arabs from 
practising their cultures. Some participants saw integration as happening, and as improving over 
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time and generations; others argued that integration is happening slowly if at all; and yet others 
highlighted the fact that integration is a personal matter, and as such, whilst some individuals 
manage to integrate, others have a harder time. Arguments made by participants either highlighted 
good relations with the Maltese, or else pinpointed difficulties – both institutional and on a personal 
level – that hinder the integration of Arabs in Malta. This section presents some of the various 
issues raised concerning integration in more detail. We do this by presenting selected claims by 
theme, together with illustrative excerpts from the interviews. 
 
2.3.1 Cultural 
This theme concerned cultural elements where religion did not necessarily play a major part. 
Participants either argued that similarities can help the Maltese and Arabs get along, or else that 
there are differences between the Maltese and Arabs. The main claims can be summarised as 
follows: ‘Shared cultural elements help integration’; ‘We have different views on gender’; and 
‘Maltese and Arab cultures are contrasting’. 
 
Participants were of the opinion that the fact that the language is similar helps Arab integration to 
a great degree, as Arabs tend to pick up Maltese very easily. Moreover, a shared sense of hospitality 
and Mediterranean characteristics meant that Arabs find it easier to integrate in Malta than in other 
European countries, which were perceived as being less friendly and more rigid when it comes to 
integration. Participants also view Arabs and the Maltese as sharing the same attitude toward life, 
whereby both are relatively easy-going and know how to have a good time: 
 
“[Regarding the Maltese:] If you’re a friend, they’re generous, you go out with them and 
you enjoy yourself with them, right? And Arabs are the same eh, you make friends with 
them, you enjoy yourself with them, and they respect you.” 
 
Other points raised focused on the differences between Arabs and the Maltese, which sometimes 
come as a shock to the Arab seeking to integrate. Participants argued that whilst Arabs tend to be 
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more tight-knit and value reciprocity highly, the Maltese have a different set of expectations when 
it comes to day-to-day human dealings, which are not always easy for outsiders to pick. Moreover, 
cultural restrictions among Arab Muslims on issues such as alcohol, and different views on gender 
and gender relations, were cited as examples of other differences. 
 
2.3.2 Religious (religio-cultural) 
This theme concerned religious elements, both in isolation and with reference to culture. Such 
arguments mostly made reference to relations between Muslims and Christians. Summarised 
claims that are typical of this theme include the following: ‘There are good relations between 
Christians and Muslims’; ‘Arabs have to be diplomatic to integrate’; ‘Religion makes Arabs stick 
out’; ‘Islamic Arabic culture hinders integration’; and ‘Both Maltese and Arabs fear imposition by 
the other group’. 
 
This theme involved highly varied points of view. Some participants highlighted the fact that there 
are good relations between Christians and Muslims in Malta, and that in all the years they have 
spent in Malta, they never experienced discrimination because of their religious affiliation. 
Moreover, the importance of mutual respect between Christians and Muslims was emphasised. 
Other participants highlighted the fact that religion makes Arabs stick out among other foreigners 
in Malta, for better or for worse, because Islam is very dear to many Arabs. Another opinion was 
cognizant and understanding of the fact that both the Maltese majority and the Arab minority fear 
a loss of cultural and religious identity. Other participants highlighted the perceived exclusivist 
attitude of the Maltese, whereby if one is not Maltese and Christian, then they are excluded from 
social circles; or else, the perceived conservative elements that some Arabs hold onto, causing 
them to disengage from society at large. 
 
A dichotomy emerged whereby some participants favoured education as a way of improving 
people’s knowledge on religio-cultural differences, whereas others argued that it is better to be 
diplomatic and avoid speaking about religion, in order to maintain good relations with the locals. 
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One notable qualifier made by participants to such arguments concerned the view that religious 
differences do not necessarily hinder integration to a large extent, since people divide themselves 
on a myriad of issues with associated labels (e.g., Nationalists vs Labourites; Catholics vs Jehova’s 
Witnesses, etc.), so Christianity and Islam are no different matter. 
 
2.3.3 Socio-political 
This theme concerned issues that are central to integration. Such views generally made reference 
to integration directly, and specified whether integration is taking place or not, and what possible 
solutions there are to improve relations between Maltese and Arabs. Summarised claims of this 
type include the following: ‘By granting their rights, Arabs feel respected and tensions decrease’; 
‘Integration depends mostly on migrants’; ‘Institutionalised discrimination hinders integration’; 
‘Many Arabs stick to their own’; ‘Racism and the far-right are problematic’; ‘There are good 
relations between Maltese and Arabs in Malta (Arabs integrate)’; ‘Integration is the only option’; 
‘The integration of foreigners, including Arabs, is improving over time’; ‘Integration is happening 
slowly if at all’; and ‘There are many good examples of integration, even though they’re not 
mentioned very often’. 
 
In this theme, some participants expressed points of view that highlighted the possibility of other 
solutions apart from integration (such as assimilation into a broader category; or a melting pot of 
cultures), whilst still arguing that integration, if implemented properly, is a good option. 
Contrastingly, some participants argued that integration depends more on migrants, be they Arab 
or not, because they are the guest who is seeking to be included in society. This was countered by 
arguments stating that Arabs should not be forced to integrate against their will, for example, by 
being pushed to participate in activities that are not in line with their beliefs. Whilst some 
participants saw integration as happening very slowly if at all, others argued that integration is 
improving over time and generations, and mentioned younger migrants and locals as examples of 
improved relations. More importantly, the central arguments in this theme concerned (a) 
institutional hurdles such as very slow bureaucratic procedures that leave many migrants without 
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appropriate documentation, (b) cases of outright institutionalised discrimination against migrants, 
and (c) the indispensability of some form of integration or mutual belonging: 
 
“No, the only alternative is that we have to live together. We have to live together, 
cooperate with each other, we don’t have any other choice. Except that we discuss and 
we see what, what we agree on and we cultivate that which we agree upon, and where we 
don’t agree we avoid, or at least we don’t provoke each other.” 
 
2.3.4 Psychological 
This theme concerned issues of individual differences. These generally arose with reference to 
relations between individual Maltese and Arab people. The main claims can be summarised as 
follows: ‘Some Arabs integrate more than others’; ‘The Maltese are friendly with Arabs they know 
personally even though they say bad things about us’; ‘There are different Arabs and Maltese – 
both can be open or cautious toward each other’; ‘The Maltese are greedy’; ‘The Maltese are kind-
hearted and welcoming.’ 
 
This theme was particular in that it delved into individual-level and detailed differences within 
both migrants and local communities. Besides a mix of both positive and negative views of the 
Maltese, this theme is most notable for the frequently made claim: ‘Some Arabs integrate more 
than others’. This belief was based on different reasons and examples of Arabs who have a harder 
or easier time integrating. Participants generally argued that Arabs who are less conservative, who 
marry a local, who are not traumatised by war, who are younger, who work with the Maltese, who 
were born in Malta, and who are lucky enough to find themselves in welcoming situations in Malta, 
generally have an easier time. Moreover, participants generally expressed awareness of the fact 
that whilst many locals say bad things about Arabs, once people get to know each other, they tend 
to have good relations with each other. Some participants took this as an indication of underlying 
tensions, whilst others argued that making such exceptions for people we know is a normal aspect 
of being human. 
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2.3.5 Stigma-related 
This theme highlighted different sources of stigma. Summarised claims include the following: 
‘The Maltese have a very negative image of Arabs (due to history / education system)’; and ‘The 
media puts us in a very bad light’. Such arguments generally made reference to the media and its 
negative influence and heavily biased reporting vis-à-vis Arabs. Participants argued that this is 
only to be expected, since the media is profit-driven and needs to create stories in order to sell. 
Moreover, participants gave numerous examples of media bias, such as exaggerations and 
sensationalizing vis-à-vis Muslims, where numbers were conflated to advance a negative view of 
Muslims (e.g., during times of prayer). Moreover, participants argued that the collective memory 
of the Maltese and the education system conflate Arabs with Turks, and depict Arabs as the 
principal enemy, despite Malta having been under the control of other powers (such as the French 
and the British) that are not represented in adversarial terms.  
 
2.3.6 Economic 
This theme highlighted economic relations. The main claims can be summarised as follows: 
‘Foreigners contribute greatly to the country’ and ‘The Maltese want immigrants here for work 
but don’t want them to be themselves’. Whilst emphasising the role that immigrants have played 
in sustaining the country’s economic growth, arguments within this theme also highlighted 
mistreatment by employers who ask employees to remove the hijab despite company regulations, 
and examples of people who have a hard time finding a job because of their religious affiliation. 
This theme thus highlighted the double standards associated with wanting immigrants to sustain 
the country’s economy, whilst giving them a hard time and telling them to do as requested or else 
face the consequences: 
 
“So, the Maltese want foreigners in Malta and they don’t want them to be themselves” 
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2.4 SCALE COMPOSITION: MALTESE AND ARAB ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE STATEMENTS 
The findings from the study with Arab participants, and those from the previous study with Maltese 
participants (Sammut et al., 2018) were used to develop an integration scale consisting of 12 
statements relating to the integration of Arabs in Malta (see Appendix B for a more detailed 
explanation on how this measure was developed). The 12 statements that make up the integration 
scale, informed by arguments made by both Maltese and Arab participants, were ranked by 
independent experts according to how pro- or anti-integrationist they are2: 
 
1. The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst fully keeping their cultural and 
religious differences – living together is highly beneficial. 
[Most pro-integration item] [Weight: 6] 
 
2. It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs engage with each other (e.g., at 
work, at school, etc.) instead of isolating themselves. [Weight: 5] 
 
3. Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side by side makes for a strong and diverse 
society, both here in Malta and elsewhere. [Weight: 4] 
 
4. The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, heritage, language and mentality can 
help us get along. [Weight: 3] 
 
5. As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs. 
[Weight: 2] 
 
6. As with other cultures, cultural contact between Arabs and the Maltese can be good in some 
specific respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.). [Weight: 1] 
 
7. The religious and cultural differences between Arabs and the Maltese can be problematic 
when it comes to living together. [Weight: -1] 
 
                                                          
2 When used in the national survey (Study 2), the statements were scored according to the weighted value in brackets multiplied by 
the rating on the scale (e.g., if a participant rated agreement with Statement 1 as being 4 on a 7-point scale, this score was 24 [4x6], 
etc.). These scores for the 12 statements were added to calculate the overall views on integration. 
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8. Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get along with 
the locals. [Weight: -2] 
 
9. Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture are too contrasting for us to get along 
well. [Weight: -3] 
 
10. At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will want to impose their way of life on the 
other. [Weight: -4] 
 
11. It would definitely be better if the Maltese and Arabs avoid dealing with each other 
altogether. [Weight: -5] 
 
12. Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense - we simply should not mix. 
[Most anti-integration item] [Weight: -6] 
 
These items are presented below, together with a selected illustration of the arguments feeding into 
such items from both groups: 
 
Figure 1. Arguments supporting Scale Items 
Arguments by Maltese             Scale item   Arguments by Arabs 
 




































This section outlined a study conducted in order to understand the arguments of Arabs concerning 
the integration of Arabs in Malta. This study, and that by Sammut et al. (2018) with Maltese 
participants, had three strong key points. Firstly, the qualitative analysis used allowed for a level 
of detail that is not usually achievable using other forms of analysis, such as standard thematic 
analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Secondly, the interview protocol and data analysis procedures 
were highly similar across studies, and thus the elicited arguments can be meaningfully compared, 
as illustrated in the above diagrams. Thirdly, the argumentative themes featuring in the arguments 
made by Maltese participants and those made by Arab participants were almost completely 
identical, even though both groups differed in their arguments. This presents a unique opportunity 
to try to understand the divergences and convergences in opinion, which are crucial for designing 
effective communication strategies in the service of improved intergroup relations. 
 
In contrast with the arguments made by the Maltese (Sammut et al., 2018; see Appendix A), which 
were predominantly anti-integrationist, Arabs tended to highlight the necessity of improved 
intergroup relations. Various examples of discrimination were provided by the Arab participants, 
together with an acknowledgement of the sensitivity of the issues involved, self-critical arguments 
vis-à-vis cultural conservatism, and the importance of considering intergroup relations in detail by 
noting people’s various backgrounds and current situations (e.g., as indicated in the psychological 
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theme). Examples of good relations with the Maltese were also substantial, and featured on various 
levels, both individual and societal. The term ‘integration’ was defined in many different ways. 
Yet, whereas both positive and negative features of Arab-Maltese relations were highlighted by 
Arab participants, the view held by most participants was that some form of integration or mutual 
belonging is both desirable and necessary, despite the difficulties involved. This warranted further 
investigation, especially in view of the extremely negative ratings given by Maltese to Arabs in 
previous research (Sammut & Lauri, 2017; see Appendix A). 
 
The arguments of both groups were thus brought together, in order to look at the convergences and 
divergences between views. The result of this procedure was an integration scale that is highly 
ecologically valid. That is, the notions, arguments and positions signified by the statements making 
up the scale are notions, arguments and positions that one expects to find in the Maltese public 
sphere specifically. This is notably important when researching intergroup relations. If one were 
to use a scale that is not based on arguments made by the communities being surveyed, then the 
risk of misattribution, misunderstanding, or else perceived bias in statements composing the scale 
is substantial. This is grounded in literature (e.g., Choi, Yang & Chang, 2009) showing that 
members of different groups construe neutral information as favouring ‘the other side’. The fact 
that the statements making up the scale all make sense for both the Maltese and Arabs means that 
the eventual survey participant perceives and understands the statements in line with the dominant 
arguments made by his/her group, and either positions himself/herself for such arguments or 
against them. For instance, if a Maltese respondent were to fill in the scale, and is asked to rate 
Statement 5 (“As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs”), 
the reasoning behind such a statement would not be alien to the respondent, regardless of his or 
her position on the matter. The respondent would then position himself/herself by giving a number, 
say, on a scale from 1 to 7, to indicate one’s level of agreement. Accordingly, the next section 
details a national survey that was conducted with this goal in mind.  
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 20 
3.0 NATIONAL SURVEY: STUDY 2 
 
The national survey was carried out between November 2019 and January 2020. 340 members of 
the Maltese public across the various Maltese regions completed an online questionnaire, which 
took around 10 minutes to complete. Eligible participants were (a) Maltese persons of non-Arab 
origin, (b) persons of Arab origin, and (c) persons of mixed Maltese-Arab origin. Participants were 
recruited by means of snowball sampling. The was done because it was not possible to base the 
sample on the distribution of national key demographic characteristics in the case of the Arab 
population. Given that the main objective was to compare the distributions of the Maltese and 
Arabs vis-à-vis their views on integration, obtaining a sample based on such characteristics did not 
constitute an indispensable criterion. No personal details were collected during the course of this 
research. The survey was available in English, Maltese, and Arabic. The University of Malta 
procedure for research ethics evaluation was followed and filed with the Faculty for Social 
Wellbeing Research Ethics Committee (FSW-FREC). All participant data remained anonymous 
and participants were made aware of the purpose of the study. This section details the sample 
characteristics, the research tool involved, and the results obtained. 
 
3.1 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
A total of 340 participants completed the integration scale (i.e., they indicated their level of 
agreement with each of the statements, and what they think the levels of agreement of the other 
group are on the same statements). In total, 217 Maltese participants, 105 Arab participants, and 
18 participants of mixed origin completed the integration scale. Out of these, 276 participants 
completed the full survey. Participants of mixed origin were excluded from the analysis due to the 
small number of participants in this category. Given that the proportions of Arabs in Malta in the 
various demographic categories are unknown, the sample was not weighted when carrying out the 
analysis. The sample (excluding participants of mixed origin) had the following key characteristics 
(see Appendix C for more details): 
 
  




  Frequency Percentage (%) 
Gender Female 144 54.3 
 Male 121 45.7 
Age 18-30 134 41.6 
 31-50 133 41.3 
 51+ 55 17.1 
Region Gozo and Comino 10 3.9 
 Northern 54 20.9 
 Northern Harbour 101 39.1 
 South Eastern 19 7.4 
 Southern Harbour 27 10.5 
 Western 47 18.2 
Education Primary 1 0.4 
 Secondary  44 17.1 
 Post-Secondary 60 23.3 
 Tertiary  153 59.3 
Occupation Worker 200 75.5 
 Student 39 14.7 
 Homemaker 12 4.5 
 Pensioner/ Retired 10 3.8 
 Unemployed 4 1.5 
 
 
3.2 RESEARCH TOOLS AND PROCEDURES 
The measures used in the national survey included: (a) nationality, (b) the integration scale, (c) 
mentalities, and (d) demographic characteristics. These measures are explained in turn below (see 
Appendix F for the full survey). 
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3.2.1 Nationality 
Participants were initially asked to self-categorize themselves as either (I) of Maltese origin 
(without Arab origin); (II) of Arab origin (with or without Maltese nationality); or (III) of mixed 
Maltese-Arab origin (with or without Maltese nationality). Depending on their choice, participants 
were led to different versions of the same survey. One version was intended for group I, another 
was intended for group II, and finally another version was intended for group III. 
 
3.2.2 Integration scale 
The 12 statements making up the integration scale were presented to participants, who were 
presented with each statement one at a time and asked to rate their agreement with the statement 
on a scale from 1 to 7. Participants were also asked to rate the extent to which they thought that 
the other group agreed with the presented statements. The ‘other group’ consisted of “Arabs” for 
participants in group I, and “Maltese” for participants in group II. The items were presented in 
random order, in order to counteract any patterned responses relating to the order of presentation 
of the statements. 
 
3.2.3 Mentalities 
People’s general outlook on life is often measured using measures that tap into people’s 
fundamental views on society or their cultural contexts. A recent development in this area 
constitutes scholarly work on mentalities (Sammut, 2019), which are suitable for studying the 
Maltese context. Participants were asked to indicate their agreement, on a scale from 1 to 5, with 
items meant at tapping into (a) the Reward mentality, (b) the Civic mentality, (c) the Survivor 
mentality, (d) the Localised mentality, and (e) the Pragmatic mentality (see Appendix C). The 
Reward mentality is held by individuals striving to work hard and obtain a desired outcome; the 
Civic mentality represents the drive to fix problems or address social issues; the Survivor mentality 
involves fatalism, distrust in institutions and the need to overcome adversity; the Localised 
mentality seeks to preserve social bonds and is provincial in outlook; and the Pragmatic mentality 
is protective, involving the preservation of one’s interests in a dynamic world. Participants were 
also asked to indicate the mentality that comes closest to their views. 
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Figure 2. Mentalities 
 
 
3.2.4 Demographic characteristics 
Participants were asked to indicate their (a) Gender; (b) Age; (c) Locality; (d) Level of education; 
and (e) Occupation (see Appendix C). 
 
3.3 FINDINGS 
The survey data was analysed by means of statistical comparisons. This section details the findings 
of the national survey. 
 
3.3.1 Views on integration 
On the integration scale, the highest possible overall score is 126, and the lowest possible score is 
-126, as the twelve statements were weighted depending on how pro- or anti-integrationist they 
are (see Section 2.4 above). The Arab participants expressed significantly more favourable views 
toward integration than the Maltese (see Figure 3). Similarly, Maltese participants attributed a 
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significantly higher mean overall score to Arabs than Arabs attributed to the Maltese. That is, the 
Maltese attributed more pro-integrationist views to Arabs, than Arabs did to the Maltese. Whilst 
the Maltese attributed pro-integrationist views to Arabs, this was significantly less than the pro-
integrationist views expressed by Arabs themselves. Thus, the Maltese appear to underestimate 
the level of pro-integrationist sentiment among Arabs. In contrast, there is no statistically 
significant difference between what the Maltese think about integration and what Arabs think that 
the Maltese think. This shows that Arabs are generally aware of what the Maltese think about 
integration overall. All groups expressed overall pro-integrationist views, and attributed overall 
pro-integrationist views to the other group, to different degrees. The following figure presents (a) 




Figure 3. Overall views on integration 
 
Notes. The lowest possible score on the Integration scale is -126 (anti-integration), and the highest possible score is 
+126 (pro-integration). Bars marked with the same symbol are significantly different from each other (p < 0.05). 
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3.3.2 Detailed comparison of Maltese and Arab responses 
Comparisons between the responses of Maltese and Arab groups on all the 12 statements of the 
integration scale yielded insightful results. Arabs indicated significantly higher agreement than the 
Maltese on all the 6 pro-integrationist statements. Similarly, the Maltese indicated significantly 
higher agreement than the Arabs on all the 6 anti-integrationist statements – except for Statement 
8 (“Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get along with 
the locals”), on which there were no differences between Arabs and the Maltese. There were also 
no significant differences between Maltese views and Arabs’ perception of Maltese views on this 
statement. On the other hand, the Maltese perceived Arabs as endorsing Statement 8 to a 
significantly lower degree than Arabs actually do and to a significantly lower degree than the 
Maltese do themselves. There were no significant differences between Arabs’ views on this 
statement, and Arabs’ perception of Maltese views. 
 
Figure 4. Views on Statement 8 
(“Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get along with the locals”) 
 
Notes. *Maltese attributions to Arabs vis-à-vis Statement 8 were significantly lower than Maltese views, Arab views, 
and Arab attributions to Maltese (p < 0.05). 
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Also noteworthy is the fact that Statement 5 (“As a minimum, there should be no discrimination 
between the Maltese and Arabs”) constituted the item with the highest agreement in the Maltese 
group, and that Statement 2 (“It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs engage with 
each other (e.g., at work, at school, etc.) instead of isolating themselves.”) was the item with the 
highest net agreement across groups, followed closely by Statement 5 (see Table 2). The tables 
and graphs below summarize the results of the comparisons of Maltese and Arab responses 
described above: 
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Table 2 
Mean Maltese and Arab responses to the statements in the Integration Scale 
 
Scale items Group Mean Standard Deviation 
1 – Extremely pro-integration Maltese 4.69* 1.816 
The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst 
fully keeping their cultural and religious differences – 
living together is highly beneficial. 
 
Arab 6.15* 1.343 
2 – Highly pro-integration Maltese 5.23* 1.751 
It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs 
engage with each other (e.g., at work, at school, etc.) 
instead of isolating themselves. 
 
Arab 6.30* 1.285 
3 – Quite pro-integration Maltese 4.35* 1.935 
Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side by 
side makes for a strong and diverse society, both here in 
Malta and elsewhere. 
 
Arab 5.70* 1.732 
4 – Rather pro-integration Maltese 4.24* 1.845 
The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, 
heritage, language and mentality can help us get along. 
 
Arab 5.48* 1.468 
5 – Somewhat pro-integration Maltese 5.35* 1.755 
As a minimum, there should be no discrimination 
between the Maltese and Arabs. 
 
Arab 6.16* 1.374 
6 – Slightly pro-integration Maltese 4.94* 1.731 
As with other cultures, cultural contact between Arabs 
and the Maltese can be good in some specific respects 
(e.g., new food, music, etc.). 
 
Arab 5.76* 1.362 
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Scale items Group Mean Standard Deviation 
7 – Slightly anti-integration Maltese 5.15* 1.744 
The religious and cultural differences between Arabs 
and the Maltese can be problematic when it comes to 
living together. 
 
Arab 3.09* 1.830 
8 – Somewhat anti-integration Maltese 4.76 1.938 
Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural 
practices private in order to get along with the locals. 
 
 
Arab 4.68 1.863 
9 – Rather anti-integration Maltese 4.24* 2.018 
Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture are 
too contrasting for us to get along well. 
 
 
Arab 2.83* 1.795 
10 – Quite anti-integration Maltese 4.74* 1.821 
At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will 
want to impose their way of life on the other. 
 
 
Arab 3.21* 1.895 
11 – Highly anti-integration Maltese 3.29* 2.038 
It would definitely be better if the Maltese and Arabs 
avoid dealing with each other altogether. 
 
 
Arab 1.68* 1.451 
12 – Extremely anti-integration Maltese 3.12* 2.024 
Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense – 
we simply should not mix. 
 
 
Arab 1.72* 1.244 
Notes:  
Responses were given on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
* Differences between groups are statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
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Table 3 
Mean Maltese and Arab attributed responses to the statements in the Integration Scale 
 
Scale items Group Mean Standard Deviation 
1 – Extremely pro-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.54 1.700 
The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst 
fully keeping their cultural and religious differences – 
living together is highly beneficial. 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.40 1.752 
2 – Highly pro-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.82* 1.661 
It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs 
engage with each other (e.g., at work, at school, etc.) 
instead of isolating themselves. 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.01* 1.712 
3 – Quite pro-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.27* 1.879 
Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side 
by side makes for a strong and diverse society, both 
here in Malta and elsewhere. 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.62* 1.767 
4 – Rather pro-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.33 1.635 
The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, 
heritage, language and mentality can help us get 
along. 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.20 1.643 
5 – Somewhat pro-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 5.49* 1.722 
As a minimum, there should be no discrimination 
between the Maltese and Arabs. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.82* 1.833 
6 – Slightly pro-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.93 1.509 
As with other cultures, cultural contact between 
Arabs and the Maltese can be good in some specific 
respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.). 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.67 1.536 
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Scale items Group Mean Standard Deviation 
7 – Slightly anti-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.40 1.777 
The religious and cultural differences between Arabs 
and the Maltese can be problematic when it comes to 
living together. 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.11 1.794 
8 – Somewhat anti-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 2.97* 1.709 
Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural 
practices private in order to get along with the locals. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.91* 1.676 
9 – Rather anti-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.18 1.842 
Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture 
are too contrasting for us to get along well. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.99 1.800 
10 – Quite anti-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.49* 1.785 
At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will 
want to impose their way of life on the other. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.85* 1.859 
11 – Highly anti-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 2.99 1.732 
It would definitely be better if the Maltese and Arabs 
avoid dealing with each other altogether. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.14 1.706 
12 – Extremely anti-integration Maltese attributions to Arabs 2.87* 1.667 
Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense 
– we simply should not mix. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.61* 1.811 
Notes:  
Responses were given on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
* Differences between groups are statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
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Figure 5. Maltese and Arab views on integration   
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Figure 6. Maltese and Arab attributed views on integration  
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Figure 7. Maltese views and Arab perceptions of Maltese views on integration  
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Figure 8. Arab views and Maltese perceptions of Arab views on integration  
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3.3.3 Mentalities and views on integration 
Participants in this study were asked to indicate the mentality that comes closest to their views. 
Within the Maltese group, those who identified with different mentalities were found to hold 
different views on integration. More specifically, those participants who identified mostly with a 
Civic mentality (i.e., those who have the drive to fix problems or address social issues) were 
significantly more likely to be pro-integration than those who identified mostly with a Reward 
mentality (i.e., those striving to work hard and obtain a desired outcome).  
 
Within the Arab group, those participants who identified mostly with a Reward mentality were 
significantly more likely to be pro-integration than those who identified with a Survivor mentality 
(this involves fatalism, distrust in institutions and the need to overcome adversity).  
 
3.4 DISCUSSION 
This section presented the results of a national survey concerning the views of the Maltese and 
Arabs in Malta on migrant integration. The results indicated that Arabs hold more pro-
integrationist views than the Maltese, and that Arabs generally tend to be aware of the views of 
the Maltese, as can be seen in the statistical analysis above, especially in the line graphs. In general, 
both groups ranked the pro-integrationist items in overall positive territory (above the midpoint of 
a 7-point scale), whereas there were more divergences between groups (in terms of overall positive 
or negative territory) in the anti-integrationist items. The focus on Arab migrants was warranted, 
given prior research indicating widespread negative attitudes toward this socio-ethnic group. 
Despite the negative attitudes levelled at Arabs by the Maltese (Sammut & Lauri, 2017, Sammut 
et al., 2018, Buhagiar et al., 2018), Arabs favoured integrationist views in this study. Another 
relevant finding concerned the fact that both groups agreed to a similar extent with assimilationist 
views (Statement 8 - “Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order 
to get along with the locals”). Arabs held fairly accurate views concerning the extent to which the 
Maltese endorse assimilationist views; on the other hand, the Maltese underestimated the extent to 
which Arabs endorse assimilationist views. 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 36 
Moreover, the relationship between mentalities and views on integration merits discussion. Among 
the Maltese, those identifying with a Reward mentality had significantly less pro-integrationist 
views than those identifying with a Civic mentality. However, among Arabs, those identifying 
with a Reward mentality were significantly more likely to be pro-integration than those identifying 
with a Survivor mentality. The Civic mentality is concerned with improving the social order. On 
the other hand, the Reward mentality emphasises the drive to achieve, by working hard and having 
a positive outlook; and the Survivor mentality holds a negative outlook on life and one’s prospects, 
seeking to survive day by day. This finding shows that if one is Maltese and is doing well in life 
(e.g., financially), then one is less likely to be pro-integration. This finding is in line with a previous 
finding obtained by Sammut and Lauri (2017), which showed that feelings of security (personal, 
cultural, and economic) are negatively correlated with support for multicultural ideology. In 
contrast, among Arabs, the Reward mentality may be associated with building further links with 
locals (e.g., for achievement purposes), and hence tends to favour pro-integrationist views based 
on the benefits brought about by mutual contact. Yet, Arabs identifying with a Survivor mentality 
could be the ones being left behind by the system; given the lack of opportunities – perceived or 
actual – in their surroundings, such individuals find little meaning in mutual engagement. We now 
proceed to discuss these findings more systemically, and to make recommendations based on the 
findings from this study.  
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4.0 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
This report presented findings from qualitative research concerning Arabs’ views on integration, 
and the composition and ranking of statements based on qualitative data from both Maltese and 
Arabs. The resulting integration scale was used in a national survey carried out amongst Maltese 
and Arabs, yielding the results detailed above. 
 
The fact that Arabs expressed significantly more pro-integrationist attitudes than the Maltese 
merits consideration. Two reasons can explain this result. Firstly, minorities may perceive 
integration as serving their interests more than majorities do. This is a valid reason in its own right, 
because integration would mean that minorities safeguard, or in some cases actually create, spaces 
for practising their own cultural and religious beliefs, whereas the majority would already be 
comfortable in this regard. This finding also accords with Berry’s (2006) research showing that 
integration results in the least distress for people seeking to adapt to new cultural contexts, and as 
such is perceived by minorities as beneficial. Moreover, Arabs were significantly more in favour 
of all the pro-integration items in the survey. Essentially, Arabs saw full integration, mutual 
engagement, the possibility of various places of worship, mutual similarities, the minimal 
condition of non-discrimination, and the benefits of cultural contact (i.e., Statements 1 – 6), as 
being more desirable than did the Maltese, who also generally saw such notions as being desirable. 
Therefore, apart from practical reasons for favouring integration, such levels of agreement may 
also indicate a willingness among the Arab minority for more active efforts toward integration or 
mutual engagement with the host majority, beyond practical reasons. 
 
Secondly, the integrationist views of Arabs can be explained with reference to the positive ratings 
given to the Maltese by Arabs ten years ago (Sammut & Lauri, 2017; see Appendix A), indicating 
continuity in perceptions. Moreover, the fact that Arabs are generally aware of the views of the 
Maltese concerning integration, indicates that Arabs on the whole have maintained some form of 
regular contact with the Maltese, more so than the Maltese sought to have with Arabs. One reason 
for this is that, given that the Maltese are in the majority, it would be necessary for Arabs to have 
some form of interaction with them, thus gaining access into the views of the Maltese. On the other 
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hand, the Maltese need not seek contact with the Arab minority in order to navigate the social 
sphere and secure a decent living. This same awareness may also indicate that Arabs are generally 
aware of the negative attitudes held toward them by the Maltese (cf. Sammut et al., 2018), beyond 
their views on integration. This partly explains the fact that no difference was found between Arabs 
and the Maltese when it came to Statement 8 (“Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural 
practices private in order to get along with the locals”). This statement signified assimilationist 
views and was ranked by experts among the six anti-integrationist statements in the integration 
scale. This means that awareness of anti-integrationist views among the host majority may lead 
some minority members to adopt assimilationist views (as indicated by the slight overall 
endorsement of Statement 8 among Arabs), in an effort to get along with locals. 
 
4.1. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR COMMUNICATIONS 
The integration scale was based on prior interviews conducted with both Maltese and Arab 
communities, and mirrors everyday issues discussed among both groups. As described above, the 
twelve statements that form part of the scale were ranked by experts in fields related to intercultural 
relations, in order of pro- and anti-integrationist sentiment. As a result, these statements neatly 
capture the varied points of view on integration using language that is understood and similarly 
construed by both Maltese and Arab communities. This makes the integration scale an excellent 
tool to use in communication strategies that aim to change views on intergroup relations. The scale 
can be used as a tool for staircasing public opinion as follows. 
 
4.1.1 Staircasing public opinion 
Any communications strategy that aims to reduce the gap between the views of locals and migrants 
should take into consideration the consolidation of ideas relating to non-discrimination (Statement 
5 - “As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between Arabs and the Maltese”) as a 
reasonably obtainable goal. The reason is that whilst Statement 5 was significantly more favoured 
by Arabs than the Maltese, this statement was also the one most favoured among the Maltese when 
compared to other statements. Given that the Maltese generally gave the lower ratings to pro-
integrationist statements, this statement represents a goal that can be reasonably aspired to at 
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present, as it represents views that the Maltese may be more willing to concede. Moreover, it 
should be kept in mind that as long as there are significant differences between hosts and migrants 
when it comes to views on non-discrimination, it can be difficult to promote other goals, at least 
at present, due to issues with public rejection of views perceived as being too far removed from 
one’s own. Once the objective of more wide-spread acceptance of non-discrimination is reached, 
different goals can be aspired to on the basis of this attainment. (For instance, if one’s goal is to 
achieve higher levels of pro-integrationist sentiment, one could then proceed further by staircasing 
public opinion toward the endorsement of Statements 4, 3, 2 and 1; see Appendix E) 
 
In consolidating agreement with non-discrimination (Statement 5), public messages are likely to 
be more effective if they start by acknowledging statements (and arguments backing such 
statements) in the integration scale that are adjacent to the one on which both majority and minority 
show similar levels of agreement. This means incrementally acknowledging the arguments behind 
statements 8, 7 and 6, respectively. All statements are backed by arguments made by both Maltese 
and Arabs and can thus be presented in ways that appeal to both groups, if presented with reference 
to the arguments made by them. Such arguments can be effective in influencing public opinion 
and nudging different communities to consider or acknowledge the ideas behind one statement, 
and then the next, and so on.  
 
For instance, messages targeting the Maltese should take into consideration how the Maltese rated 
each of the twelve statements (see Table 2). However, they should also consider whether such 
statements were viewed by the Maltese as being more highly rated by Arabs (see Table 3), as 
statements seen as being more favoured by minorities can lead to reactance, despite slight average 
agreement among majority members (see Appendix A). A way to take both views and attributions 
on board involves acknowledging the ideas behind initial statements (e.g., Statement 8) in public 
messages before proceeding to the adjacent statements (Statements 7, 6, and 5). In case of 
communications with the Maltese majority, such messages should be based on the arguments 
sensible for the Maltese (see Figure 1). Similarly, if messages were to be addressed to the Arab 
minority, the rating of the statements by Arabs (see Table 2) and their attributions to the Maltese 
(see Table 3) should be considered, in like manner. Messages targeting both groups can involve a 
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mixture of such arguments. Importantly, these messages need to be presented in an open-ended 
manner (as opposed to being presented in a closed, conclusive manner), in a way that allows for 
further dialogue and engagement. Accordingly, if arguments with similar levels of agreement 
between groups are presented first (such that the majority, in this case, does not view the minority 
as favouring the arguments more highly), the audience is more likely to be receptive to further 
arguments later, thus moving toward the attainment of non-discriminatory views. This is especially 
the case with anti-integrationist statements (e.g., Statements 8 and 7, toward the mid-point) when 
the goal is to shift public opinion toward pro-integrationist views (e.g., Statements 6 and 5, toward 
the mid-point). The following section outlines an example of how to staircase public opinion 
specifically among the Maltese, using arguments based on the above reasoning. 
 
Step 1: “Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get 
along with the locals.” (Statement 8) 
In the findings above, the item on which both groups do not differ significantly was identified. 
This item represents an issue on which both groups are willing to accommodate, and a point at 
which the distributions of both groups overlap. The statement supporting assimilation (Statement 
8 – “Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get along with 
the locals”) fitted this criterion, as both groups expressed slight agreement with the item, without 
there being significant differences between groups. Secondly, it was determined whether any of 
the groups in question perceive this same item as being favoured more highly by the other group 
(see Section 3.3.2). The fact that neither Arabs nor the Maltese perceived the other group as 
favouring Statement 8 more so than they themselves did, avoids issues with perceived bias. This 
is because perceiving a particular strategy as favouring the outgroup, increases the risk of 
perceiving the strategy as biased. Accordingly, the strategy should be implemented to 
incrementally shift public opinion from Statement 8 toward the acceptance of statements adjacent 
to it. 
 
When initially presenting or acknowledging the ideas behind Statement 8 to the Maltese, it could 
be argued that knowledge of the local culture can help migrants integrate better in society, and that 
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migrants’ ability to communicate in similar ways can help ease social relations between locals and 
migrants, as per the following adapted argument. The following adapted arguments are all based 
on the arguments of the Maltese concerning the integration of Arabs in Malta, which were the 
result of a previous qualitative inquiry (Sammut et al., 2018; see Figure 1 above): 
 
“Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get 
along with the locals. This is because they can practise their own beliefs, as long as 
they do not influence or bother others. When you are in public, it’s best to do as the 
locals – this applies regardless of who you are or where you are from. And when you 
are in a private setting, for example at home, you can do whatever you like. The more 
exposed to European culture, the more capable migrants are of integrating. They 
would be able to communicate in a similar manner to us, and there would be less 
chance that they segregate themselves to live on their own. At the same time, there are 
certain differences between us that one would do well to acknowledge.”3 
 
Once this specific notion (based on Statement 8) has been addressed by acknowledging the ideas 
and arguments behind it, the next step can involve acknowledging the existence of some 
differences between groups (Statement 7 – “The religious and cultural differences between Arabs 
and the Maltese can be problematic when it comes to living together”). 
 
Step 2: “The religious and cultural differences between Arabs and the Maltese can be 
problematic when it comes to living together.”  (Statement 7) 
Here, arguments acknowledging different views of religion and gender relations can be made, 
based on the argument structures above. Once again, the message has to be open-ended, employing 
the softer variants of argument, such that this allows for future opinion modification. For example, 
one needs to emphasise that the desirable end would be to get along (“when it comes to living 
                                                          
3 In all adapted arguments, the underlined sentence represents the hook to the next argument (in this case, the one 
based on Statement 7). 
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together”) despite our differences. The following adapted argument demonstrates this more 
substantively (based on Sammut et al., 2018): 
 
“The religious and cultural differences between Arabs and the Maltese can be 
problematic when it comes to living together. This is because Arabic culture can 
perhaps be different from our culture, when compared to the cultures of other 
countries, like European ones. The environment which we come from influences how 
we relate with each other, and our mentalities are different at times. For example, 
there could be differences between us in terms of how we look at religion, and how we 
look at the roles of women and men in our society. Nevertheless, contact between us 
can still result in good outcomes.” 
 
Step 3: “As with other cultures, cultural contact between Arabs and the Maltese can be good 
in some specific respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.).” (Statement 6) 
Eventually, specific benefits of cultural contact (Statement 6 – “As with other cultures, cultural 
contact between Arabs and the Maltese can be good in some specific respects (e.g., new food, 
music, etc.)”) should be argued for, based on the cultural and instrumental benefits of contact. 
Given the Maltese arguments backing this statement (see Figure 1), this message can build on the 
previous message, arguing that encountering people who practise different cultures results in novel 
experiences, and thus cultural contact can be beneficial. Moreover, this statement represents a pro-
integrationist notion that is close to the mid-point, and thus provides the base for making other 
arguments supporting good relations between hosts and migrants. The following adapted argument 
presents what needs to be communicated (based on Sammut et al., 2018): 
 
“As with other cultures, cultural contact between Arabs and the Maltese can be good 
in some specific respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.). This is because there are 
intriguing elements in the Arab world, like good food, for instance, which we can 
appreciate because of new restaurants that are opening in our country. At the same 
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time, many Arabs bring business and this helps our economy. Cultural contact can 
also be beneficial because when we meet with people from other cultures, we open our 
minds to new possibilities and experiences. Nevertheless, for us to have a good 
experience together, we have to treat each other with respect.” 
 
Step 4: “As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs.” 
(Statement 5) 
After sequentially presenting the previous arguments or acknowledging their content, non-
discrimination (Statement 5 – “As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the 
Maltese and Arabs”) should be argued for. This involves acknowledging perceptions of unjustified 
fear and media bias, and pointing the way forward. As indicated above, this statement represents 
a reasonably obtainable goal at present. Therefore, effort should be made to consolidate the views 
on this statement. The goal is to reduce the gap between different levels of endorsement by the 
majority and the minority of this statement, such that the Maltese endorse non-discriminatory 
views to a larger extent. Progress can be measured using the integration scale, to see whether the 
differences between groups diminish following this attempt. The argument for Statement 5 still 
needs to be made in an open-ended manner, with a view to allowing for public opinion to be 
staircased further in future if desired (see Appendix E). The following adapted argument presents 
what needs to be communicated: 
 
“As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs. 
Although the fear of Arabs is prevalent in Malta, this fear is not justified and can cause 
problems. This is because word spreads fast here in Malta, and many Arabs end up 
suffering because of the wrongdoings committed by few. Stigma toward Arabs is based 
on events that happened in our history, which are not a reflection of today’s reality. 
When this fear is spread on the news and social media, the Arabs among us end up 
being mistreated because of things that are not their fault. Accordingly, it’s good that 
– as a minimum – we aspire toward treating each other in the same way. At the same 
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time, perhaps we can go further than that, and focus on that which unites us instead of 
that which divides us.” 
 
4.1.2 Discussion: Moving forward 
The strategy outlined above has a number of advantages. Firstly, communication strategies based 
on these principles have the advantage of avoiding polarisation. By building arguments 
sequentially instead of immediately pushing for views that are more pro-integrationist, it is more 
likely that the message is given some consideration rather than being rejected straight away. 
Identity fears expressed by locals are thus acknowledged whilst simultaneously promoting the 
endorsement of non-discrimination, thus preventing potential conflict between groups. When the 
public is engaged with positions that are not perceived as being antagonistic to their own, the 
chances of shifting public opinion improve. Thus, relevant stakeholders and community leaders 
are more likely to be brought together. 
 
Secondly, this strategy can engage both groups involved if desired: it is possible for work to be 
done both within groups and across groups. Communication within groups can involve persons of 
influence in the respective communities. This interim strategy needs to involve arguments that 
make sense to the different communities, as detailed in this report. For instance, in advancing non-
discrimination (Statement 5 - “As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the 
Maltese and Arabs”), arguments concerning unjustified fear and stigma among the Maltese, and 
the need to treat migrants equally can be used with Maltese communities, as per the above adapted 
arguments (see Section 4.1.1). Equally, Arabs’ arguments can be advanced with Arab communities 
(see Figure 1). Given the nature of this statement, arguments by the minority making reference to 
perceived or actual real-world events would have to be adapted accordingly, for instance by 
acknowledging experiences of discrimination and the dangers involved, and by exhibiting 
alternatives to media bias against Arabs (such as the existence of good examples of fair treatment 
and fair portrayals by the Maltese; see p. 14). Importantly, given that Arabs’ arguments concerned 
issues like institutionalised discrimination, media bias and racism, such messages will only work 
if these issues are simultaneously addressed in actuality, beyond the implementation of such 
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strategies. Therefore, for the above strategy to work, discrimination and biased reporting should 
be addressed in more concrete terms when they occur. Communication strategies across groups 
can constitute campaigns – for example, through broadcasted messages – that acknowledge the 
arguments of both groups and nudge the public into embracing the desired item content. Such 
messages would need to incorporate the arguments made by both groups, so that the message does 
not simply resonate with the dominant or non-dominant group. 
 
In view of the present findings, we recommend that a first step would be to reduce the gap between 
groups vis-à-vis endorsing non-discrimination, by communicating arguments with the Maltese that 
incrementally push for non-discrimination. This would enable the Maltese and Arab views of 
integration and of each other to converge. Incidents of discrimination should also be addressed, 
both to improve migrants’ lives and to retain the relatively pro-integrationist views among Arabs, 
thus avoiding polarisation. The integration scale can be used to keep track of public opinion and 
assess whether goals are being successfully implemented, and whether groups are converging in 
their views of integration as well as of each other.  
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5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, this report shed light on the state of intercultural and intergroup relations in Malta. 
The survey shed light on the main trends being observed in Maltese society. In addition, this report 
introduces the integration scale, which can be used as a tool for devising communication strategies. 
Given the findings, we recommend that a communication strategy be devised and implemented 
with the Maltese. It is recommended that the strategy outlined above is adopted in order to shift 
public opinion incrementally toward the acceptance of views in line with achievable goals. 
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APPENDIX A: BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
 
 
Intergroup relations remain a widespread issue, and are a topmost concern in the political and 
research agendas of many European countries, specifically as pertaining to immigration 
(Verkuyten, 2018). The key to understanding intergroup relations remains that of building valid 
measures aimed at understanding the factors that perpetuate negative intergroup relations, and the 
interventions needed to address them (Bar-Tal, 2011). Being at the EU’s Southernmost border, 
Malta has had its fair share of immigration. Moreover, as its most densely populated and smallest 
member state (Eurostat, 2014), issues surrounding immigration play out in specific ways in the 
Maltese context, as the island parameters constitute a factor that research must consider. 
 
This literature review starts by looking at intergroup and intercultural relations more broadly, and 
the various approaches used to study them. It then proceeds to review literature concerning the 
various acculturation strategies that have been proposed over the years, including some tentative 
interventions in modifying public opinion. The focus is then narrowed down to the local scenario, 
outlining the research that has been conducted in the Maltese islands, both vis-a-vis attitudes 
toward different socio-ethnic groups, and vis-a-vis the Arab minority more specifically. This 
section concludes by summarizing the current state of the art in terms of interventions, and by 
outlining the research that has led to the present inquiry. 
 
A.1 INTERGROUP AND INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS 
Intergroup relations refer to situations where different people interact – either individually or 
collectively – in meaningful manners on the basis of their group identification. Intergroup relations 
have been studied from various perspectives in the social sciences. Among core topics, those 
relating to social identity, and prejudice and discrimination, have remained salient over the years. 
Intergroup relations can often result in conflict, of varying degrees. In turn, such conflict may be 
based on people’s social identity needs. Social identity refers to one’s sense of belonging to a 
particular group (e.g., ethnic group, cultural group, national group, etc.), as opposed to others. 
Different individuals may identify more or less strongly with a particular group, depending on 
various factors such as the amount one spends thinking about a group, positive feelings toward a 
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group, and perceptions of similarity between oneself and group members (Cameron, 2004). 
Research on social identity shows that individuals align themselves with particular groups as 
opposed to others, and engage in comparison with relevant outgroups in order to enhance their 
self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For instance, partisan social identity has been shown to be a 
highly significant predictor of support for party-related ideologies, more so than traditional 
measures of partisan strength (such as asking someone whether they see themselves as being 
independent, weak partisans, or strong partisans; Greene, 2004). The strength of one’s social 
identity also predicts perceptions of injustice toward one’s ingroup in situations of conflict, and a 
desire to improve the livelihood of one’s ingroup (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Apart from concerns 
with social identity, group relations may also change due to mutual perceptions of realistic conflict, 
that is, due to the presence of contrasting group goals and scarce resources which groups can only 
obtain at the expense of other groups (Jackson, 1993). 
 
A subset of intergroup relations is that of intercultural relations, which have become more acute 
and relevant in the context of global democracies. Research on intercultural relations extends the 
concerns of intergroup relations research by focusing squarely on how different cultural 
backgrounds and practices influence associations between people. Be it social identity or perceived 
conflictual goals, cultural variables influence the degree to which group members perceive the 
same issues (e.g., national policies) in differing manners. Accordingly, much intergroup and 
intercultural relations research over the past decades has shifted towards understanding how 
different groups perceive each other in different ways, and how such perceptions and 
representations influence whether policy implementations work or not. 
 
This is based on a line of research indicating that regardless of whether information is portrayed 
neutrally or in a biased manner, different cultural groups are highly likely to perceive such 
information in different, sometimes even contrasting manners. They are also likely to attribute bias 
to such content, which is seen as favouring ‘the other side’ (Choi, Yang & Chang, 2009). For 
example, football supporters whose team wins are likely to claim that the result was due to their 
team’s skills and capabilities. Conversely, football supporters whose team loses are more likely to 
argue that the other team was lucky or that the referee was biased against them. Such phenomena 
are based on universal cognitive processes, whose continual study has informed our understanding 
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of intergroup relations over the years (Ross & Nisbett, 2011). Specifically, groups can be closed-
minded in relation to the view or aims of the outgroup (Bar-Tal, 2011), and social psychological 
biases, like naive realism (Ross and Ward, 1996), can potentially result in altogether different 
appraisals of the same contested grounds for conflict. Naïve realism is a cognitive bias whereby 
individuals believe that they see things as they really are, and that others’ discrepant views are 
biased and subjective, unlike their own (Ross and Ward, 1996, p. 110-111). Naïve realism 
underpins various intergroup phenomena. A notable one is that of the hostile media phenomenon, 
where groups in conflict tend to see neutral media content as being biased and favouring their 
outgroup (Vallone et al., 1985). Conflicting groups tend to ignore the nuances of their outgroup’s 
beliefs, and rather assume that the outgroup’s views are ignorant and manifestly wrong (Sammut 
and Sartawi, 2012). A possible result of such psychological repertoires is the furthering of spirals 
of conflict between groups (Sammut, Bezzina & Sartawi, 2015). 
 
Another phenomenon that has been shown to be crucial in understanding intergroup relations and 
conflict is that of motivated reasoning (Molden and Higgins, 2005). Motivated reasoning is a 
general form of reasoning whereby instead of aiming for truthful conclusions, individuals reason 
in such a way as to reach desired conclusions, whether intentionally or not (Kunda, 1990). 
Motivated reasoning underlies many activities, from health behaviours to reasoning about 
statistical information to intergroup conflict (see Kunda, 1990). Given its ubiquitous influence on 
human decision-making and action, motivated reasoning should be considered in research and 
interventions aimed at improving intergroup and intercultural relations. Issues surrounding mutual 
perceptions of groups by each other, and mutual perceptions of policies and national strategies 
thus feature as key concerns in this report. 
 
A.2 ACCULTURATION STRATEGIES 
In this applied research area, various models and solutions have been proposed vis-à-vis 
intercultural relations over the years. One fruitful area of research has been that of intercultural 
strategies, which refer to the ways in which both dominant and non-dominant groups in society 
behave toward each other, and expect their counterpart to behave toward themselves. Essentially: 
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“When examined among non-dominant ethnocultural groups that are in contact 
with a dominant group, these preferences have become known as acculturation 
strategies. When examined among the dominant group, and when the views held are 
about how non-dominant groups should acculturate, they have been called 
acculturation expectations” (Berry, 2011) 
 
Berry (2011) proposes four strategies, which are based on two fundamental issues facing all groups 
situated in intercultural societies (see also Berry, 1997). These two fundamental issues concern: 
(a) the extent to which emphasis is placed on retaining one’s cultural heritage and cultural identity; 
and (b) the extent to which groups are willing to make contact with each other and participate in 
society as a whole. These two continua give rise to the four different intercultural strategies. Firstly, 
(a) assimilation is the strategy pursued when ethnic groups do not seek to cultivate their identity, 
but do interact with other groups in society. Secondly, (b) integration is pursued when groups 
simultaneously retain and cultivate their cultures, whilst seeking relationships with other cultural 
groups in society. Thirdly, (c) separation is pursued when groups seek to cultivate and hold on to 
their culture, whilst abstaining from interaction with other groups. Finally, (d) marginalization 
occurs when groups neither keep their original culture, nor do they seek interactions with others 
(whether voluntarily or not; Berry, 2011). 
 
Whilst requiring its fair share of modifications and accommodations by both dominant and non-
dominant groups, Berry (2006) has argued for integration as the best outcome, especially if the 
goal is to reduce stress brought about by acculturation pressures in non-dominant groups (Berry, 
2006). Nonetheless, other streams of research have explored other strategies, such as assimilation; 
for instance, research has shown that the Maltese in Britain tend to favour assimilation as a 
preferred intercultural strategy (Sammut, 2010). Moreover, other researchers have ventured 
beyond the quadrant above by studying the impacts of having toleration as a key characteristic of 
majority/minority relations. For example, recent research has re-ignited the dialogue concerning 
the importance of toleration-based approaches in reducing prejudice in situations where dominant 
groups view minority cultures as being incompatible with their own (Verkuyten, Yogeeswaran & 
Adelman, 2019). Once again, sensitivity toward the mutual perceptions and representations of the 
groups concerned remain key. For instance, whether minorities perceive their situation as being 
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one of discrimination toward them, acceptance or toleration, can have effects on both their 
wellbeing and also influence whether they align themselves more with their ethnic group or with 
the larger national group in the host country (Cvetkovska, Verkuyten & Adelman, 2020). 
 
A.3 INTERVENTIONS OVER THE YEARS 
There have been many interventions seeking to change public opinion, or to redress problems 
having to do with intergroup and intercultural contact when it goes wrong. Chief among these have 
been efforts at intergroup contact, which is premised on the idea that when conditions are 
favourable (e.g., when individual group members are of similar status), contact between 
individuals of conflicting groups can serve to attenuate the negative perceptions that each group 
holds of the other. Whilst intergroup contact has worked in certain domains, it usually holds little 
promise in situations of intractable conflict, where there are mutual and deeply ingrained negative 
outlooks shared between the groups involved. Other approaches, aimed at supplementing 
intergroup contact, constitute top-down legislative change, intergroup negotiations and even 
bargaining in settings that allow for dialogue that is conducive to improved relations (Messick & 
Mackie, 1989). Moreover, other approaches seek to change public opinion such that groups in 
conflict come to see each other as being part of a common ingroup identity (such as a national 
category, or broader categories like membership in supranational states, etc.) (Martinez-Ebers, 
Calfano & Branton, 2019). 
 
What many of these approaches do not consider is how publics argue and think about such matters. 
That is, whilst fruitful, such approaches do not take into account the qualitative dimension involved 
in arguing for or against a particular topic of controversy (Billig, 1987). Understanding which 
arguments make sense among dominant and non-dominant groups in society is indispensable for 
improved intergroup relations. Outside of intergroup settings, social marketing campaigns aimed 
at improving societal outcomes have been successful in recent years, both outside and within the 
local context (Lauri, 2015). In social marketing, the aim is to devise strategies for influencing 
public opinion, such that groups in society become more open to ideas having to do with societal 
matters. Whilst such strategies have been influential outside the intergroup domain (e.g., with 
regards to organ donation; Lauri, 2015), further research and efforts are needed in order to apply 
social marketing to issues having to do with intergroup and intercultural relations. 
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A.4 RESEARCH IN THE LOCAL CONTEXT 
In Malta, research in 2010 demonstrated that the Maltese held positive attitudes toward West 
Europeans, lukewarm attitudes toward East Europeans and Asians, and negative attitudes toward 
Arabs in Malta (Sammut & Lauri, 2017). Importantly, such socio-ethnic groups held positive 
attitudes toward the Maltese. The more striking finding of the research by Sammut and Lauri 
(2017) is that all socio-ethnic groups – that is, the Maltese, West Europeans, East Asians and South 
Asians – gave the worst rating to Arabs, when asked to rate groups using a 100-point feeling 
thermometer. The only exception to this were East Europeans, who gave a slightly worse rating to 
South Asians than to Arabs. In essence, both the majority group and the other minorities in Malta 
seem to converge in their antipathy toward Arabs. Moreover, for the Maltese, only the rating for 
Arabs was in the negative territory (below the midpoint of the scale). Nonetheless, Arabs gave 
relatively high ratings to all groups, and the highest rating to the Maltese.  The fact that Arabs were 
found to hold positive attitudes toward the Maltese, whilst the Maltese hold negative attitudes 
toward the Arab socio-ethnic group, indicates that it could be possible that an assimilationist 
strategy is being favoured in the practices of some Arab communities in Malta. In fact, Arabs also 
demonstrated significantly higher ratings than almost all the other groups on a measure tapping 
into migrant assimilation (Sammut & Lauri, 2017). These findings therefore inspired further 
research looking into views held toward Arabs, and the integration of Arabs, in Malta. Before 
presenting qualitative research concerning the integration of Arabs in Malta, it is worth noting that 
in 2019, the 100-point feeling thermometers indicated longitudinal trends: that is, the attitudes of 
the Maltese toward Eastern Europeans and Arabs in Malta have worsened (Sammut & Brockdorff, 
2019). 
 
A.4.1 Qualitative interviews: Maltese views on the integration of Arabs 
The findings of such widespread negative attitudes have prompted further qualitative research 
seeking to understand the arguments of Maltese citizens concerning the integration of Arabs in 
Malta. Integration, as an intercultural strategy, is one that is presently being pursued at a national 
level in Malta (Ministry for European Affairs and Equality, 2017), and thus presents itself as a key 
topic of discussion. Semi-structured interviews were conducted and sought to understand the 
various arguments that the Maltese make for and against the integration of Arabs in Malta. The 
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interviews were conducted between December 2015 and January 2016 (Sammut et al., 2018). 
These results indicated arguments made by the public for and against integration. Such arguments 
appeal to six main themes: socio-politics, stigma, religion, psychology, culture and economics. 
The arguments made by the Maltese were overwhelmingly negative, and indicated a lack of 
resources for constructing a positive view of Islam (Sammut et al., 2018). That is, whilst all 
argumentative themes had a positive counterpart (i.e., examples of arguments supporting the 
integration of Arabs), no positive religious arguments were made for Arab integration (Sammut et 
al., 2018; cf. Buhagiar et al., 2020). Of the argumentative themes, Sammut et al. (2018) present 
three main arguments: a positive socio-political argument; a negative socio-political argument; 
and a mixed socio-political argument concerning integration. The most notable argumentative 
claims (i.e., take-home messages advanced by participants) that emerged from this study were the 
following: “We never had problems with Arabs, they integrate and we get along”; “Arabs isolate 
themselves and do not integrate”; “Arabs impose their culture on others”; “Migrants can practise 
their beliefs as long as they don’t bother or influence others”; and “The more exposed to European 
culture, the better capable Arabs are of integrating” (Sammut et al., 2018). Such claims variably 
advanced the following arguments. 
 
Firstly, positive arguments for integration emphasised the long history of Arab-Maltese relations, 
especially in the domain of mutual trade. Moreover, some participants expressed the possibility of 
learning from each other and expanding one’s outlook on culture and life in general, through 
intercultural contact. Participants also noted good examples of interactions with Arabs at work, 
and the misfortune of discrimination at the workplace: 
 
“I think they, a lot of them are misunderstood, I think a lot of them are 
maybe a bit mistreated [. . .] They’re being singled out, you know” (Sammut et al., 2018) 
 
Negative arguments were more prevalent and were mainly based on a view of Arabic culture as 
being backward and hindering progress. Participants referenced what they saw as huge differences 
between Arab and Maltese culture, and the notoriety that Arabs have gained in the global sphere, 
in order to argue for caution in interacting with Arabs. Moreover, participants expressed 
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reservations about Islam and argued against the charge of racism made to those who seek to protect 
the country’s local ways: 
 
“. . . if I oppose a different culture from mine, or to say, I don’t agree 
with it and it bothers me, whatever, that’s because I’m racist.” (Sammut et al., 2018) 
 
Finally, participants also made mixed arguments concerning integration, which tended to be 
noncommittal vis-à-vis integration, or else emphasised both its positive and negative aspects. 
Respondents also argued that people are different, and as such, the issue of whether locals and 
hosts actually get along should be seen on a case by case basis. Such arguments however, were 
also made with reference to culture, and normative implications tended to run through the mixed 
arguments: 
 
“You’d have those that would be slightly more, ehm, cultured, more, how do I say it, they 
have a bit of exposure.” (Sammut et al., 2018) 
 
Given the prevalence of cultural considerations in most of the arguments above, this research was 
followed up by an abductive analysis (Buhagiar et al., 2018) seeking to understand the dominant 
pattern of argumentation supporting anti-integrationist arguments. More specifically, results 
pointed towards the ubiquity of arguments from cultural essentialism. These arguments pushed a 
view of ‘Arabic culture’ as one that is (a) monolithic, and (b) an essential element of Arabs 
themselves, thus making the prospect of integration a difficult one. Different forms of cultural 
essentialism were expressed; these varied in terms of which aspect of ‘Arabic culture’ they 
emphasised. Firstly, such arguments were used to reduce Arabs to their culture, such that other 
aspects of their being were ignored by participants. Alternatively, such arguments saw Arabs as 
being determined by their culture, such that if Arabs are bred in a culture of war and conflict, then 
according to the participants, they would remain prone to violence wherever they go. Arguments 
from cultural essentialism were also used to delineate Arabs as an entity that is clearly separate 
from the Maltese, and such perceived boundaries were used to argue against integration. Finally, 
culturally essentialist arguments were also used to depict Arabs as being bound to cause trouble, 
if not now, then over time. Very few positive arguments from cultural essentialism were made; 
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that is, Arabic culture was rarely seen as being a monolithic yet beautiful or worthy entity. In 
essence, this abductive analysis demonstrated that cultural issues are a key concern for the Maltese 
majority vis-à-vis the Arab minority in Malta, and are used to promote anti-integrationism 
(Buhagiar et al., 2018). 
 
Such studies are in line with recent research showing that racism and discrimination are 
experienced by minorities in educational settings and at young ages (Cefai et al., 2019). Moreover, 
local findings are analogous to those at the European level, highlighting the negative attitudes 
toward Arabs and Islam that are experienced by such socio-ethnic minorities across the continent 
(see Buhagiar et al., 2020). This also serves to highlight the importance of taking sociocultural 
contexts into account when doing intergroup relations research. Whilst migrants may reach 
Maltese shores with neutral or even hopeful expectations, the representations of the dominant 
group and those of non-dominant groups are not necessarily always in line. 
 
A.5 MOTIVATED REASONING AND ARGUMENTATION 
The literature reviewed above indicated the need for further research looking at people’s views on 
the integration of Arabs in Malta, with the aim of better understanding majority-minority relations 
in Malta. More specifically, the convergence of antipathy among socio-ethnic groups towards 
Arabs, justifies the present undertaking. The goal is to arrive at a situation where campaigns can 
achieve fruitful results in terms of shifting intergroup relations such that these align with desired 
goals. Importantly, the take-home message from the above research is that mutual perceptions 
between groups cannot be ignored. Ignoring mutual perceptions risks employing social marketing 
or other campaigns that are not sensitive to the way that such groups construe the strategies being 
promoted, be they integration, toleration, assimilation or other strategies. 
 
The literature above on motivated reasoning is in itself a compelling case for exploring how people 
argue for or against a specific intercultural strategy, such as integration. This makes it important 
to use research methods that engage participants in argumentation, as did the above research on 
Arabs in Malta (Sammut et al., 2018; Buhagiar et al., 2018). In this study, Maltese participants 
were engaged in argumentation interviewing (Sammut et al., 2018), where participants were asked 
directly for their views concerning the integration of Arabs. After the participants’ main claims (or 
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take-home messages) were elicited, the interviewer asked questions aimed at understanding the 
warrants, or reasons for such claims; the backings, or assumptions, made by participants to support 
their reasoning; any statements made by participants as qualifiers or rebuttals to an argument; and 
any data, or evidence (e.g., personal experiences, things they saw on the media, etc.) the 
participants found relevant to substantiate their argument. Argumentation analysis was then used 
to analyse the interviews and elicit these various components of argument. This form of analysis 
involved coding the separate claims made by participants concerning the integration of Arabs. 
Such claims were then thematically categorized, and the rest of the argument components were 
subsequently analysed to understand how the main claims were legitimized by participants. 
 
Further conceptual work was then conducted, making use of Kruglanski’s (2012) lay epistemic 
theory, which states that lay individuals reason in such a way as to support specific conclusions, 
in line with the literature on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). According to lay epistemic 
theory, individuals reason in such a way as to solve perceived problems, using subjectively 
relevant evidence, in the service of desired conclusions. What this means to say is that people use 
their own subjective criteria for adopting a position for or against integration depending on what 
is meaningful to them personally, rather than some objective or overarching aspiration. The theory 
has been applied in various domains, most notably in the domain of persuasion, where Kruglanski 
& Thompson (1999) developed the “unimodel of persuasion”, which posits persuasion as a process 
in which different types of evidence – which can be of any kind, as long as they are subjectively 
relevant to the reasoning individual – are used to draw persuasive conclusions. The unimodel of 
persuasion has been very fruitful in re-considering previous data in psychology, and has been 
applied to areas such as health communication (Kruglanski et al., 2006). 
 
This model is very parsimonious, meaning that it does not make unnecessary assumptions about 
human reasoning and persuasive behaviour; this makes it very amenable to empirical research 
where intercultural considerations are foregrounded. Nevertheless, the insights gleaned from the 
unimodel of persuasion (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999) are yet to be explored in intergroup 
relations. Based on the unimodel of persuasion, an argument can be conceptualised as being 
composed of the following basic structure: a main claim, warrants and evidence used to 
substantiate this claim, and statements qualifying the claim if necessary. Other argument 
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components (such as backings and rebuttals, outlined above) become redundant, as this model 
explores how arguments are used to directly convince and persuade. This allows us to study how 
members of various groups argue in such a way as to favour their own ingroup goals. The basic 
structure is also sensitive to cultural differences, and does not utilize argument components that 
might not feature across all socio-ethnic groups (cf. Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2009). 
 
A.6 CONCLUSION 
This section has provided an overview of intergroup relations research, and more specifically, local 
research in this domain. Conceptual work vis-à-vis the basic components of argument was also 
presented. The studies presented in this report were built on these considerations, both 
conceptually and in terms of the empirical endeavours undertaken. The convergence of negative 
attitudes toward Arabs in Malta justified the present undertaking.  
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APPENDIX B: SCALE FORMATION 
 
The interviews with both Maltese and Arab participants were analysed using argumentation 
analysis: this involved noting the central arguments made by participants, and the justifications 
participants provided for their arguments. This yielded a set of arguments against and for 
integration, or else arguments stating that integration is not or is taking place, for each set of 
interviews. Accordingly, this meant that such claims could be thematically organized, such as to 
yield different Statements (henceforth referred to as Items), that variously supported or opposed 
integration, to various degrees. Consider the below examples: 
 
 




Example: argument by Arabs 
 
 
In these examples, very similar claims are made, however they are legitimated with reference to 
different reasons and different examples. That is, the claims are mutually intelligible across social 
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groups, even though the warrants, evidence and qualifiers sustaining such claims can differ in their 
prevalence and currency within said groups. Based on this reasoning, the claims relevant to 
integration, made by both Arabs and the Maltese, were thus thematically categorized on the basis 
of their similarities. This meant that different sets of arguments, made by both Maltese and Arab 
participants, were noted for their correspondence to each other (e.g., if they treated a similar 
theme). When arguments corresponded to each other to a sufficient degree, these were categorized 
under one item which they helped formulate. The items were worded in such a way that the 
eventual scale would be as symmetrical as possible, that is, using adjectives and other operators 
indicating different degrees of strength, both for or against integration. As such, participant claims 
informing the scale items may have been used to support a softer or a stronger version of the item 
itself (e.g., no group argued directly for racism, but an item supporting racism was necessary to 
counterbalance the fully integrationist end of the scale). This process resulted in 12 items. Given 
that this scale was based on both sets of interviews, this scale made sense for both the Maltese and 
Arabs in Malta. 
 
The 12 items were then subjected to expert rankings. 15 experts, from various backgrounds related 
to intercultural relations, were asked to rank the items in order, with the 1st item being the most 
pro-integration all the way to the 6th item, which was the least pro-integration. Similarly, item 7 
to item 12 were ranked, with item 7 being the least anti-integration (within the anti-integration 
items) and item 12 being the most anti-integration item. It is worth noting that the scale had no 
midpoint, as it would be unclear whether a midpoint, in this case, references neutral attitudes 
toward integration or else ambivalence or disinterest in the topic. The mean expert ranking for 
each item was taken as the position of each item. The means of all the 12 items approximated a 
normal curve, with the values of the most pro-integration items, and those of the most anti-
integration items, being more distant from the items toward the middle of the scale. The scale 
ranged from the belief that people can beneficially live together whilst keeping their different 
religions and cultures, all the way to the view that racism is sensible. 
 
The fact that the ranking of the scale was made on the basis of expert rankings ensured a relatively 
common metric in the scaling exercise. ‘Integration’ is a term that has multiple meanings for 
different people, depending on their social background and their views on integration itself. 
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Accordingly, relying on expert rankings ensured that the project (see Buhagiar & Sammut, 2020) 
being discussed (in this case, integration) had a somewhat similar meaning to the experts involved, 
not least based on their training and formal education. At the same time, having expert rankers 
from different backgrounds ensured the heterogeneity needed for the scaling exercise not to be 
skewed in favour of one dominant interpretation. The formation and ranking of the scale put us in 
an excellent position to be able to survey the views of integration circulating among the Maltese 
and Arabs in Malta. 
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  Maltese Arabs Total 
Gender Frequency Male 83 38 121 
 % in group  46.4% 44.2% 45.7% 
  Female 96 48 144 
   53.6% 55.8% 54.3% 
Age Frequency 18-30 71 63 134 
 % in group  32.7% 60.0% 41.6% 
  31-50 97 36 133 
   44.7% 34.3% 41.3% 
  51+ 49 6 55 
   22.6% 5.7% 17.1% 
Region Frequency Gozo and Comino 10 0 10 
 % in group  5.7% 0.0% 3.9% 
  Northern 45 9 54 
   25.9% 10.7% 20.9% 
  Northern Harbour 44 57 101 
   25.3% 67.9% 39.1% 
  South Eastern 14 5 19 
   8.0% 6.0% 7.4% 
  Southern Harbour 20 7 27 
   11.5% 8.3% 10.5% 
  Western 41 6 47 
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   Maltese Arabs Total 
Education Frequency Primary 0 1 1 
 % in group  0.0% 1.3% 0.4% 
  Secondary 38 6 44 
   21.3% 7.5% 17.1% 
  Post-Secondary 44 16 60 
   24.7% 20.0% 23.3% 
  Tertiary 96 57 153 
   53.9% 71.3% 59.3% 
Occupation Frequency Worker 155 45 200 
 % in group  86.6% 52.3% 75.5% 
  Student 5 34 39 
   2.8% 39.5% 14.7% 
  Homemaker 8 4 12 
   4.5% 4.7% 4.5% 
  Pensioner/ Retired 10 0 10 
   5.6% 0.0% 3.8% 
  Unemployed 1 3 4 
   0.6% 3.5% 1.5% 
Relationship Frequency Not married 77 47 124 
Status % in group  43.0% 54.7% 46.8% 
  Married 97 36 133 
   54.2% 41.9% 50.2% 
  Separated/Divorced/Annulled 3 3 6 
   1.7% 3.5% 2.3% 
  Widow(er) 2 0 2 
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   Maltese Arabs Total 
Religion Frequency Christianity 147 2 149 
 % in group  82.1% 2.3% 56.2% 
  Islam 1 82 83 
   0.6% 95.3% 31.3% 
  None 27 2 29 
   15.1% 2.3% 10.9% 
  Other 4 0 4 
   2.2% 0.0% 1.5% 
Living in Frequency 1 year – 2 years 0 9 9 
Malta % in group  0.0% 10.5% 3.5% 
  2 years – 4 years 2 14 16 
   1.2% 16.3% 6.2% 
  5 years or more 170 63 233 
   98.8% 73.3% 90.3% 
Mentalities Frequency Civic 59 34 93 
 % in group  32.6% 39.5% 34.8% 
  Pragmatic 23 7 30 
   12.7% 8.1% 11.2% 
  Localised 33 13 46 
   18.2% 15.1% 17.2% 
  Reward 43 24 67 
   23.8% 27.9% 25.1% 
  Survivor 23 8 31 
   12.7% 9.3% 11.6% 
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APPENDIX D: CROSS-TABULATIONS 
 
Table D.1 
Maltese and Arab views on integration 
 
Score Group Mean Standard Deviation 
Maltese & Arab views Maltese 18.47* 55.5 
 Arab 73.24* 31.2 
Mutual attributions Maltese (to Arab) 24.29* 41.6 
 Arab (to Maltese) 7.15* 46.7 
Arab views & Maltese attributions Arab 73.24* 31.2 
 Maltese (to Arabs) 24.29* 41.6 
Maltese views & Arab attributions Maltese 18.47 55.5 
 Arab (to Maltese) 7.15 46.7 
The lowest possible score on the Integration scale is -126 (anti-integration), and the highest 
possible score is +126 (pro-integration). 
* Differences between groups are statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
 
Notes: 
Arab participants expressed significantly more favourable views toward integration (mean = 73.24) than 
the Maltese (mean = 18.47), t(313) = -11.315, p < .001. 
Maltese participants attributed a significantly higher mean overall score to Arabs (mean = 24.29), than 
Arabs attributed to the Maltese (mean = 7.15), t(320) = 3.329, p < .001. 
There were significant differences between what the Arabs think (mean = 73.24) and what the Maltese think 
that Arabs think (mean = 24.29) on integration, t(265.4) = -11.801, p < .001. 
The difference between what the Maltese think (mean = 18.47) and what Arabs think that the Maltese think 
(mean = 7.15) was not statistically significant, t(240.5) = 1.915, p = .057. 
 
Note D.1. Mentalities and views on integration 
Within the Maltese group, a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of mentalities on views on 
integration, F(4, 176) = 3.526, p < .01, η2 = 0.074; and post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s range test 
revealed significant differences (p < .01) between those expressing a Civic mentality (M = 35.78, SD = 
53.5) and those expressing a Reward mentality (M = 0.33, SD = 50.0). 
 
Within the Arab group, a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of mentalities on views on 
integration, F(4, 81) = 4.131, p < .01, η2 = 0.169; and post-hoc comparisons using Tukey’s range test 
revealed significant differences (p < .01) between those expressing a Reward mentality (M = 86.0, SD = 
19.4) and those expressing a Survivor mentality (M = 49.0, SD = 32.2). 
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Table D.2 
Maltese views on integration and Arab perceptions of Maltese views 
 
SCALE Group Mean Standard Deviation 
Item 1 – Extremely pro-integration Maltese 4.69 1.816 
The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst 
fully keeping their cultural and religious differences – 
living together is highly beneficial. 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.40 1.752 
Item 2 – Highly pro-integration Maltese 5.23* 1.751 
It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs 
engage with each other (e.g., at work, at school, etc.) 
instead of isolating themselves. 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.01* 1.712 
Item 3 – Quite pro-integration Maltese 4.35* 1.935 
Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side 
by side makes for a strong and diverse society, both 
here in Malta and elsewhere. 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.62* 1.767 
Item 4 – Rather pro-integration Maltese 4.24 1.845 
The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, 
heritage, language and mentality can help us get 
along. 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.20 1.643 
Item 5 – Somewhat pro-integration Maltese 5.35* 1.755 
As a minimum, there should be no discrimination 
between the Maltese and Arabs. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.82* 1.833 
Item 6 – Slightly pro-integration Maltese 4.94 1.731 
As with other cultures, cultural contact between 
Arabs and the Maltese can be good in some specific 
respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.). 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.67 1.536 
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SCALE Group Mean Standard Deviation 
Item 7 – Slightly anti-integration Maltese 5.15* 1.744 
The religious and cultural differences between Arabs 
and the Maltese can be problematic when it comes to 
living together. 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.11* 1.794 
Item 8 – Somewhat anti-integration Maltese 4.76 1.938 
Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural 
practices private in order to get along with the locals. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 4.91 1.676 
Item 9 – Rather anti-integration Maltese 4.24 2.018 
Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture 
are too contrasting for us to get along well. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.99 1.800 
Item 10 – Quite anti-integration Maltese 4.74* 1.821 
At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will 
want to impose their way of life on the other. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.85* 1.859 
Item 11 – Highly anti-integration Maltese 3.29 2.038 
It would definitely be better if the Maltese and Arabs 
avoid dealing with each other altogether. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.14 1.706 
Item 12 – Extremely anti-integration Maltese 3.12* 2.024 
Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense 
– we simply should not mix. 
 
 
Arab attributions to Maltese 3.61* 1.811 
 
Responses were given on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
* Differences between groups are statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
  
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 71 
 
Table D.3 
Arab views on integration and Maltese perceptions of Arab views 
 
SCALE Group Mean Standard Deviation 
Item 1 – Extremely pro-integration Arabs 6.15* 1.343 
The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst 
fully keeping their cultural and religious differences – 
living together is highly beneficial. 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.54* 1.700 
Item 2 – Highly pro-integration Arabs 6.30* 1.285 
It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs 
engage with each other (e.g., at work, at school, etc.) 
instead of isolating themselves. 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.82* 1.661 
Item 3 – Quite pro-integration Arabs 5.70* 1.732 
Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side 
by side makes for a strong and diverse society, both 
here in Malta and elsewhere. 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.27* 1.879 
Item 4 – Rather pro-integration Arabs 5.48* 1.468 
The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, 
heritage, language and mentality can help us get 
along. 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.33* 1.635 
Item 5 – Somewhat pro-integration Arabs 6.16* 1.374 
As a minimum, there should be no discrimination 
between the Maltese and Arabs. 
 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 5.49* 1.722 
Item 6 – Slightly pro-integration Arabs 5.76* 1.362 
As with other cultures, cultural contact between 
Arabs and the Maltese can be good in some specific 
respects (e.g., new food, music, etc.). 
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SCALE Group Mean Standard Deviation 
Item 7 – Slightly anti-integration Arabs 3.09* 1.830 
The religious and cultural differences between Arabs 
and the Maltese can be problematic when it comes to 
living together. 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.40* 1.777 
Item 8 – Somewhat anti-integration Arabs 4.68* 1.863 
Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural 
practices private in order to get along with the locals. 
 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 2.97* 1.709 
Item 9 – Rather anti-integration Arabs 2.83* 1.795 
Arabic Islamic culture and Maltese Christian culture 
are too contrasting for us to get along well. 
 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.18* 1.842 
Item 10 – Quite anti-integration Arabs 3.21* 1.895 
At the end of the day, the Arabs or the Maltese will 
want to impose their way of life on the other. 
 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 4.49* 1.785 
Item 11 – Highly anti-integration Arabs 1.68* 1.451 
It would definitely be better if the Maltese and Arabs 
avoid dealing with each other altogether. 
 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 2.99* 1.732 
Item 12 – Extremely anti-integration Arabs 1.72* 1.244 
Racism between the Maltese and Arabs makes sense 
– we simply should not mix. 
 
 
Maltese attributions to Arabs 2.87* 1.667 
 
Responses were given on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
* Differences between groups are statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
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Table D.4 
Maltese and Arab views and attributions on Item 8 
 
Score Group Mean Standard Deviation 
Maltese & Arab views Maltese 4.76 1.94 
 Arab 4.68 1.86 
Maltese views & Arab attributions Maltese 4.76 1.94 
 Arab (to Maltese) 4.91 1.68 
Arab views & Maltese attributions Arab 4.68* 1.86 
 Maltese (to Arab) 2.97* 1.71 
Maltese views & Maltese attributions Maltese 4.76* 1.94 
 Maltese (to Arab) 2.97* 1.71 
Arab views & Arab attributions Arab 4.68 1.86 
 Arab (to Maltese) 4.91 1.68 
Responses were given on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
* Differences between groups are statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
 
Notes: 
There were no significant differences between Maltese (mean = 4.76) and Arab views (mean = 4.68) on 
Item 8, t(320) = .390, p = .697. 
There were no significant differences between Maltese views (mean = 4.76) and Arabs’ perception of 
Maltese views (mean = 4.91) on Item 8, t(234.7) = -.711, p = .478. 
The Maltese perceived Arabs as endorsing Item 8 to a significantly lower degree (mean = 2.97) than Arabs 
actually do (mean = 4.68), t(320) = -8.163, p < .001. 
The Maltese perceived Arabs as endorsing Item 8 to a significantly lower degree (mean = 2.97) than the 
Maltese themselves do (mean = 4.76), t(216) = 11.009, p < .001. 
There were no significant differences between Arabs’ views on Item 8 (mean = 4.68), and Arabs’ perception 
of Maltese views (mean = 4.91), t(104) = -1.022, p = .309. 
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APPENDIX E: ARGUMENT STRUCTURES AND ADAPTATIONS 
 
The following are the schematic illustrations for staircasing public opinion with the Maltese vis-à-vis Items 
8, 7, 6 and 5. The equivalent summarised version of the adapted argument is presented in the report. 
 
Item 8 “Migrants would do well to keep certain cultural practices private in order to get 
along with the locals.” 
 
 
Item 7 “The religious and cultural differences between Arabs and the Maltese can be 
problematic when it comes to living together.”  
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Item 6 “As with other cultures, cultural contact between Arabs and the Maltese can be good 




Item 5 “As a minimum, there should be no discrimination between the Maltese and Arabs.” 
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The following are the adapted arguments and schematic illustrations for staircasing public opinion 
vis-à-vis Items 4, 3, 2 and 1. The sentences in bold represent the scale item. The underlined 
sentences represent the hook to the next argument. Arguments were adapted accordingly, based 
on the reasoning expressed in Section 4.1.1. 
 
Item 4: “The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, heritage, language and 
mentality can help us get along.” 
 
“The similarities between Arab and Maltese culture, heritage, language and 
mentality can help us get along. This is because, culturally, the Maltese and Arabs 
are close to each other – more so than we think. For example, sometimes it’s easier to 
communicate with each other, than with people from Northern Europe. Moreover, we 
have similar manners when it comes to hospitality and especially language – and even 
in small things like food, cooking and the fact that we sometimes shout or use our 
hands whilst speaking. The fact that Malta is geographically close to Arab countries, 
led to there being similarities in our mentality and the way we think. Accordingly, we 
should learn to use these similarities such that we have a more united society.” 
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Item 3: “Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side by side makes for a strong and 
diverse society, both here in Malta and elsewhere.” 
 
“Having Christian and Muslim places of worship side by side makes for a strong 
and diverse society, both here in Malta and elsewhere. In truth, the religious 
differences between us are not an issue when it comes to living together. This is 
because the fact remains that here in Malta, we never had situations where a group 
tried to impose its religion on another group forcefully. It’s individuals themselves 
who decide how to get along with each other; if there is reciprocal respect, the 
diversity in places of worship does not have to be a problem. To the contrary, if people 
with different views manage to relate more with each other, this would be beneficial 
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Item 2: “It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs engage with each other 
(e.g., at work, at school, etc.) instead of isolating themselves.” 
 
“It would be better for society if the Maltese and Arabs engage with each other (e.g., 
at work, at school, etc.) instead of isolating themselves. All things considered, the 
Maltese and Arabs can get along. We see this in our everyday lives, when it comes to 
small things like friendships at the place of work or when we go out. Human relations 
start off on their own; when we meet a new person, we don’t stay thinking about what 
can or cannot happen - we simply act in a natural way with each other. On the one 
hand, relating with one another is good, as we avoid isolating ourselves from each 
other and forming separate cliques, thus preventing negative consequences. On the 
other hand, relating with one another can also lead to certain benefits, like for example 
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Item 1: “The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst fully keeping their 
cultural and religious differences – living together is highly beneficial.” 
 
“The Maltese and Arabs can definitely get along whilst fully keeping their cultural 
and religious differences – living together is highly beneficial. In reality, Arabs have 
been in Malta for a long time and we never had problems with each other because they 
always integrated in one way or another. If it were true that there are problems 
because of our differences, then we would not be working together and getting along 
with one another in our daily lives. Many Maltese who visited or used to work in Arab 
countries, still have friends from those countries – till this very day. It’s a beautiful 
thing to be able to show appreciation toward each other and to enjoy the various 
cultures there are around us.” 
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APPENDIX F: NATIONAL SURVEY 
 
English version (the Maltese and Arabic versions of the survey are available by the authors):
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 81 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 82 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 83 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 84 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 85 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 86 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 87 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 88 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 89 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 90 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 91 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 92 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 93 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 94 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 95 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 96 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 97 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 98 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 99 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 100 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 101 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 102 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 103 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 104 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 105 
 
MINORITY RELATIONS IN MALTA 2019/2020 106 
 
View publication stats
